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INTRODUCTION 
This Note explores a central question in regime design: can a region 
that is arguably averse1 to human rights develop a successful system to 
police its own human rights record? Southeast Asia, a region that had, and 
arguably still has, a human rights allergy,2 has voluntarily created a human 
rights system for itself. Given that this system is institutionally weak by 
design,3 a plausible explanation for this paradoxical commitment is that it 
is simply disingenuous. Proposing reforms for an apparently disingenuous 
human rights system may at first blush appear to be a futile effort. Some 
human rights advocates may wish to wait for a different system altogether 
instead of celebrating a weak system and improving upon it. However, this 
Note argues that through harnessing social processes for influencing state 
practice,4 it is possible to stimulate even a disingenuous system to adopt 
meaningful changes over time.5 
Regional human rights systems6 (Regional Systems) are commitment 
devices that nation states in regional blocs use to hold themselves 
accountable to their human rights obligations.7 Because states enjoy the 
 
 1.  HSIEN-LI TAN, THE ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 60–61 
(2011) (using “aversion” to describe Southeast Asia’s hesitance and suspicion towards international 
human rights law). 
 2.  But see Mergawati Zulfakar and Lisa Goh, Tough Task Ahead on Human Rights, THE STAR 
(Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2f2007%2f8%2f1%2f 
nation%2f18461803&sec=nation (quoting Foreign Minister Syed Hamid’s aspiration that ASEAN 
“must not be seen to be allergic to human rights.”). 
 3.  See infra Part I. 
 4.  See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–22 (2013); infra Part III. 
 5.  See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 137, 144; infra Part III. 
 6.  Regional human rights systems consist of regional instruments and mechanisms. OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, An Overview of Regional Human Rights Systems, 
http://bangkok.ohchr.org/programme/regional-systems.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). Regional 
instruments (such as treaties, conventions, and declarations) help to “localise international human rights 
norms and standards, reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region.” Id. Regional 
mechanisms (such as commissions and courts) then help to “implement these instruments on the 
ground.” Id. 
 7.  See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, Rights and Justice: A Prospective View, in SOUTH ASIA 
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sovereign right to determine their own internal affairs without intervention 
from other states,8 participating in such commitment devices requires states 
to give up some of their sovereignty to allow a supranational body to 
monitor and criticize their domestic human rights records.9 For a state with 
a poor human rights record, consenting to a strong Regional System creates 
self-inflicted wounds—such consent requires significant political will or 
commitment to human rights.  Given the sovereignty costs of participating 
in a Regional System, one may question whether a region that is allergic to 
human rights can genuinely desire to establish a Regional System. This 
Note contextualizes the struggle in the creation and development of 
Regional Systems by examining the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), a sub-regional organization consisting of ten Asian 
states.10 
ASEAN has asserted that the application of universal human rights 
must be subject to regional particularities.11 ASEAN has argued that Asia 
has a different value system (Asian values) that may be fundamentally 
incompatible with the West’s conception of universal human rights.12 
However, despite its longstanding aversion to human rights,13 ASEAN 
created a human rights commission in 2009, called the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (ASEAN 
Commission).14 It later promulgated the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration (ASEAN Declaration) in late 2012.15 
 
2060: ENVISIONING REGIONAL FUTURES 261, 264 (Adil Najam & Moeed Yusuf eds., 2013) (“A 
regional commitment to human rights is an important device to improve conditions on the ground.”). 
 8.  G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). 
 9.  See DEBRA DELAET, THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 146 (2d ed. 2014) 
(“[R]egional human rights systems are typically limited by the fact that states are unwilling to give up 
sovereignty in the name of universal human rights.”). 
 10.  ASEAN’s ten member states include the five founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the later members, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia. The Founding of ASEAN, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/overview/ (last 
visited July 12, 2014). 
 11.  Ben Saul, Jacqueline Mowbray & Irene Baghoomians, The Last Frontier of Human Rights 
Protection: Interrogating Resistance to Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 18 AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 
23, 30–31 (2011). 
 12.  Id.; see infra Part I.C.2 for a more elaborate explanation of “Asian values.” 
 13.  TAN, supra note 1 at 60–61. 
 14.  About, ASEAN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://aichr.org/ 
about/ (last visited July 12, 2014). 
 15.  Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION (Nov. 19, 
2012), available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/asean-human- 
rights-declaration [hereinafter ASEAN DECLARATION]. For a detailed analysis of the provisions in the 
ASEAN Declaration, see Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012, 
13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 557 (2013); see also Nicholas Doyle, The Asean Human Rights Declaration And 
14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  9:48 PM 
388 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:385 
Since their inception, the ASEAN Commission and the Declaration 
have been flayed and pummeled for being some combination of weak, 
silent, and regressive.16  Nevertheless, ASEAN’s struggle with its regional 
human rights body and Asian values makes it a promising test case for 
whether and how states can construct Regional Systems that are both 
culturally sensitive and also effective in protecting internationally 
recognized human rights. 
Scholars, civil society groups and human rights institutions have 
recommended reforms for the ASEAN human rights system.17  However, 
ASEAN has not adopted many of these recommendations.18 This Note is 
the first attempt since the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration19 to propose 
a comprehensive ASEAN human rights framework that is tailored to the 
region’s particularities and informed by institutional design literature. After 
examining ASEAN’s conditions, the limitations of ASEAN’s existing 
system, and other Regional Systems, this Note proposes a human rights 
framework for ASEAN that evolves in response to local conditions. 
Contrary to the call for strong mechanisms,20 the ASEAN Commission 
should first introduce less intrusive mechanisms and build its power 
sequentially. This is because strong mechanisms are not just politically 
infeasible at the outset—they could also be counterproductive.21 The 
evolutionary nature of the proposed framework is in line with ASEAN’s 
evolutionary approach for the development of human rights, which 
augments its political feasibility.22 More importantly, it also reflects the 
lessons learned from other Regional Systems: arriving at an equilibrium 
that perfectly balances global norms and local conditions is a process, not a 
 
The Implications of Recent Southeast Asian Initiatives in Human Rights Institution-building and 
Standard-setting, 63 INT’L & COMP.  L. Q. 1, 15–27 (2013). 
 16.  See infra Part I.B. 
 17.  See, e.g., HAO DUY PHAN, A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING A HUMAN RIGHTS 
MECHANISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE FOR A SOUTHEAST ASIAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, chs. 
5–6 (Roger S. Clark et al. eds., 2012) (proposing an ASEAN Court of Human Rights, which this Note 
argues is not feasible in the short run); infra notes 127–132 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 127–132 and accompanying text. 
 19.  For a much earlier analysis of this topic, see Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in 
ASEAN Countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep,” 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 
1, 76–79 (1999). 
 20.  See, e.g., PHAN, supra note 17. 
 21.  Employing strong mechanisms may undercut “softer” mechanisms. See infra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
 22.   Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (TERMS OF REFERENCE), art. 2.5 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.asean.org/ 
images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN Commission T.O.R.]. 
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one-shot attempt.23 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the existing 
ASEAN human rights system and its limitations and challenges. Part II 
draws lessons from other Regional Systems. Finally, Part III proposes a 
multilayered human rights framework for ASEAN. 
I.  THE CURRENT ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND ITS 
CHALLENGES 
A.  Existing human rights institutions and organizations in ASEAN 
1. ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
ASEAN was initially created for political and economic cooperation 
in 1967 and did not have human rights on its agenda until the 1990s.24  In 
2009, more than four decades after its inception, ASEAN established the 
ASEAN Commission.25 The ASEAN Commission is the official 
“overarching human rights institution in ASEAN,”26 with a mandate that 
includes promoting ASEAN human rights instruments, encouraging the 
ratification and implementation of international human rights treaties, and 
promoting public awareness of human rights.27 The ASEAN Commission 
can also request information about the promotion and protection of human 
rights from its member states on a voluntary basis,28 and conduct thematic 
studies and reports for ministerial meetings.29 The ASEAN Commission 
consists of ten representatives, one appointed by each member state.30 
 
2. ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights 
of Women and Children 
In addition to the ASEAN Commission, which has a general human 
rights mandate, ASEAN has a separate commission, the ASEAN 
 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
 24.  Sriprapha Petcharamesree, The ASEAN Human Rights Architecture: Its Development and 
Challenges, 11 EQUAL RTS. REV. 46, 47 (2013). 
 25.  About, supra note 14; Irene I. Hadiprayitno, The Institutionalisation of Human Rights, in 
ASEAN 1 (Dec. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191448. 
 26.  ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 6.8. 
 27.  Id. art. 4.3–4.6. 
 28.  Id. art. 4.10. This does not include the authority to require states to submit reports on their 
human rights records. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 29.  ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.12–4.13. 
 30.  Daniel Aguirre & Irene Pietropaoli, ASEAN Regional Human Rights Protection: Lessons 
from the African and Inter American Regional Systems, 2 NAM YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY154, 167 (Kamran Hashemi & Linda Briskman ed., 2013). 
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Commissions on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and 
Children (ACWC), focused on a subset of rights that are perceived to be 
less politically sensitive.31 Established in 2010,32 the ACWC is also an 
intergovernmental consultative body.33 Its mandate is limited to women’s 
and children’s rights34 and is explicitly linked to member states’ obligations 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).35  All ASEAN member states have ratified both conventions, 
albeit with reservations.36 
ACWC encourages compliance with international and regional human 
rights norms,37 raises public awareness of the rights of women and 
children,38 and assists with preparing periodic reports to the United Nations 
and treaty bodies.39 The ACWC does not impose additional reporting 
obligations, but rather serves to complement existing state obligations to 
report to the United Nations and treaty bodies.40 
3. National Human Rights Institutions and the Asia Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions   
State governments establish National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) to promote and protect human rights in their countries.41 Although 
individual NHRIs have differing functions, they also share common ones 
such as monitoring the state, investigating and resolving complaints, or 
promoting human rights education.42 The Asia Pacific Forum of National 
Human Rights Institutions (Asia Pacific Forum) is a network of NHRIs in 
 
 31.  According to Thai representative to the ASEAN Commission Sriprapha Petchamesree, the 
rights of women and children are perceived to be a “soft issue” that is less threatening to ASEAN 
members than civil and political liberties. Sriprapha Petcharamesree, The Human Rights Body: A Test 
For Democracy Building, in ASEAN 10 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
2009), available at http:// www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Sriprapha_low_2.pdf. 
 32.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 164. 
 33.  Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ASEAN COMMISSION 
FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN art. 4 (Feb. 2010), 
available at http://www.asean.org/images/2012/Social_cultural/ACW/TOR-ACWC.pdf [hereinafter 
ACWC T.O.R.]. 
 34.  Id. art. 2.1. 
 35.  Id. art. 2.5. 
 36.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184. 
 37.  ACWC T.O.R., supra note 33, art. 5.1. 
 38.  Id. art. 5.3. 
 39.  Id. art. 5.6. 
 40.  Id. art. 3.4 
 41.  ASIA PAC. FORUM, What are National Human Rights Institutions?, http://www.asiapacific 
forum.net/establishment-of-nrhis/what-is-an-nhri (last visited July 12, 2014). 
 42.  Id. 
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the Asia Pacific region, including countries outside of ASEAN.43 The Asia 
Pacific Forum’s primary roles include strengthening existing NHRIs44 and 
supporting the establishment of NHRIs in accordance with the Paris 
Principles.45 There are currently five NHRIs in the ASEAN region—in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar.46 Four NHRIs 
(excluding Myanmar) have established their own network, called the 
ASEAN NHRI Forum.47 The ASEAN NHRI Forum has held several 
consultation meetings and developed working plans for regional 
collaboration and strategies for the promotion and protection of human 
rights.48 These four NHRIs conform to the Paris Principles:49 they are 
independent from the state and are vested with the competence to promote 
and protect human rights.50 However, Myanmar’s NHRI does not conform 
to the Paris Principles and thus does not have full membership in the Asia 
Pacific Forum.51 
4. Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
(Working Group) is a coalition of national working groups whose members 
are representatives from governments, academia, and civil society 
organizations.52 The Working Group is the only human rights civil society 
organization affiliated with ASEAN.53 Its primary goal was to establish an 
 
 43.  Andrea Durbach, Catherine Renshaw & Andrew Byrnes, A Tongue but No Teeth: The 
Emergence of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 
211, 212 (2009). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 226. The Paris Principles provide minimum standards on competence and respon-
sibilities, composition, guarantees of independence and pluralism, methods of operation and the status 
of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence. Principles Relating to the Status of National 
Institutions (The Paris Principles), G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 
(Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles]. 
 46.  NHRIs in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were established in 1987, 1993, 
2000, and 2001 respectively. Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 215. 
 47.  See Press Release, Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, ASEAN Human Rights 
Commissions Convene in Manila (Jan. 25, 2008). 
 48.  Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 227. 
 49.  INT’L COORDINATING COMM. OF NAT’L INST. FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROT. OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CHART OF THE STATUS OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 2–3 (Dec. 30, 2014), http://nhri.ohchr.org/ 
EN/Documents/Accreditation%20Status%20Chart.pdf. 
 50.  Paris Principles, supra note 45. 
 51.  Associate Members, ASIA PACIFIC FORUM, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/ 
associate-members (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
 52.  Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15; Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 222. 
 53. Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN CHARTER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, Annex 2 (Nov. 20 2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/ 
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intergovernmental human rights commission for ASEAN, 54 though most of 
its recommendations for the ASEAN Commission were rejected.55 It now 
assists in the promotion of human rights and provides recommendations to 
ASEAN organs.56 It has also “become a platform where negotiations 
regarding alleged human rights violations between non-State and State 
actors . . . can be carried out.”57 
B. Evaluation of the current ASEAN human rights system and the 
ASEAN Declaration 
1. Limitations of existing ASEAN institutions  
ASEAN officials lauded the ASEAN Commission as a “historic 
milestone” in human rights promotion and protection.58 However, a close 
inspection of the ASEAN Commission’s terms of reference indicates that 
ASEAN member states have in fact substantially restricted the 
Commission’s authority.59 Among commentators and human rights 
advocates, criticisms of the ASEAN Commission abound. It has been 
called “the world’s most toothless human-rights body,”60 “a lame duck,”61 
and mere “window dressing.”62 Even some representatives to the ASEAN 
Commission are frustrated by the Commission’s limited power.63 
The ASEAN Commission is an “intergovernmental” political entity—
 
publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. 
 54.  About Us, Working Grp. for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, http://wvw.aseanhrmech. 
org/aboutus.html (last visited July 12, 2014). 
 55.  See infra Section I.C.3. 
 56.  Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15; Petchamesree, supra note 24, at 48–49. 
 57.  Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15 
 58.  ASEAN, Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights arts. 4, 8 (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/documents/ Declaration-
aichr.pdf. 
 59.  See, e.g., ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 2.1 (restricting the ASEAN 
Commission’s actions by emphasizing non-interference and state sovereignty in the first guiding 
principle). 
 60.  ASEAN’s Toothless Council, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052970203517304574303592053848748. 
 61.  Sarinna Areethamsirikul, Can Indonesia Become the Central Leader of Asean?, THE NATION, 
(Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/03/22/opinion/Can-Indonesia- 
become-the-central-leader-of-Asean-30151407.html. 
 62.  Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy, AICHR: A Window Dressing for ASEAN’s 
Commitment to Human Rights (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.forum- asia.org/?p=6901 (last 
visited July 12, 2014). 
 63.  One representative to the ASEAN Commission expressed disappointment and apologized for 
the Commission’s inability to respond to the complaints submitted by NGOs at the ASEAN 
Commission’s inception. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 13. 
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its lack of independence from member governments is evident from its very 
name. The ASEAN Commission is comprised of government appointees 
accountable to their governments,64 who can remove the appointees at their 
discretion.65 It operates by consultation and consensus, which gives each 
state an effective veto over the Commission’s decisions.66 The ASEAN 
Commission has no permanent secretariat or office, and no ability to hear 
complaints, initiate independent investigations,67 or monitor compliance.68 
It is not even authorized to require states to produce periodic reports on 
their progress in implementing the human rights instruments that they have 
ratified.69 
The ASEAN Commission is also designed to avoid lateral pressure 
from governments outside of ASEAN.70 External funding and resources 
directed towards the ASEAN Commission are limited to the promotion of 
human rights; non-ASEAN governments cannot fund activities that protect 
human rights, such as review, monitoring, and enforcement.71 Further, 
since the ASEAN Commission’s inception, it has largely excluded civil 
society organizations (CSOs) from participation in its initiatives, including 
drafting of the ASEAN Declaration.72 Thus, it has been criticized as “an 
intergovernmental body that won’t even talk to its own citizens.”73 
The ACWC faces normative and institutional challenges.74 Even 
though all ASEAN member states have ratified the relevant U.N. treaties 
CEDAW and CRC, many states have entered reservations to their essential 
provisions.75 Consequently, there is no consensus on the legal standard for 
 
 64.  ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 5.2. 
 65.  Id. art. 5.6. 
 66.  John D. Ciorciari, Institutionalizing Human Rights in Southeast Asia, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 695, 
715 (2012). 
 67.  Id. The inability to receive complaints from victims of human rights violations “may be the 
Commission’s most hobbling handicap.” Id. at 719. The ASEAN Commission refused to consider all of 
the complaints submitted to it, including one concerning a massacre of fifty-six journalists and relatives 
of a political opposition candidate in the Philippines. Id. at 719–20. 
 68.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 166. 
 69.  Silvia Croydon, Two Rights Paths: East Asia’s Emerging Regional Human Rights 
Framework, 11 ASIA PAC. PERSP. 22, 29 (2013). 
 70.  Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 716–17. 
 71.  See id.; ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 8.6. 
 72.  Renshaw, supra note 15, at 2. 
 73.  Sri Wahyuni, ASEAN Human Rights Body Deemed “Toothless,” JAKARTA POST, Oct. 24, 
2009, at 2. 
 74.  See generally Ciorciari, supra note 66 (describing various normative and institutional 
constraints facing the ASEAN Commission and ACWC). 
 75.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184. Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, and Malaysia have 
entered reservations to essential provisions of CEDAW or general reservations. Id. For a summary of 
ratification and reservations by ASEAN member states, see Suzannah Linton, ASEAN States, Their 
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women’s and children’s rights.76 Also, ACWC’s role could overlap 
significantly with that of the ASEAN Commission, since the former 
ASEAN Secretary-General advised the ASEAN Commission to focus on 
the rights of women, children, and migrant workers first.77 Given that the 
ACWC has to coordinate with the ASEAN Commission but is not 
subordinate to it,78 this can result in a turf war and a competition for 
funding.79 
2. Why ASEAN created the ASEAN Commission   
The reasons motivating states to participate in international human 
rights regimes help explain how these regimes can influence state 
behavior.80 Thus, in designing a workable ASEAN human rights 
framework, it is essential to understand why ASEAN created the ASEAN 
Commission, and its vision for the ASEAN Regional System in general. 
Remarks from ASEAN and state government officials suggest that 
ASEAN’s decision to create the ASEAN Commission was partly out of 
pressure to catch up with human rights developments in the international 
community and to “keep ASEAN relevant.”81 The ASEAN Commission 
could also be a public relations stunt to change the world’s perception, if 
any, that ASEAN is “allergic to human rights.”82 Notwithstanding the 
desire to match other Regional Systems, ASEAN’s vision for the ASEAN 
Commission is a body limited by political reality. A senior official at the 
ASEAN Secretariat stated, “to moan about [the ASEAN Commission’s 
lack of independence] is to bark up the wrong tree,”83 because it was 
unrealistic to start the ASEAN Commission as a strong body: 
[T]he dilemma facing ASEAN members states . . . is how to 
 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed ASEAN Commission on Women and 
Children, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 436 (2008). 
 76.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 184. 
 77.  Kor Kian Beng, Human Rights Struggle, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore) (Oct. 23, 2009). 
 78.  ACWC T.O.R., supra note 33, art. 7.7. 
 79.  See Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 722. 
 80.  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for Human Rights, 15 ANN. REV. POLIT. 
SCI. 265, 280 (2012). 
 81.  James Munro, Why States Create International Human Rights Mechanisms: The ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and Democratic Lock-in Theory, 10 ASIA-PAC. J. 
HUM. RTS. 1, 23 (2009). ASEAN Secretary-General Pitsuwan explained that the “[human rights] issue 
is important in our interface with other organizations, with our dialogue partners, because this is an 
issue of concern to the international community.” Id. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas also 
remarked, “[h]ow can we avoid having the [ASEAN human rights body] when all other regional 
organizations have one already” and stated that the ASEAN human rights body should be “in line with 
the demands of the [twenty-first] century.” Id. 
 82.  See Zulfakar & Goh, supra note 2. 
 83.  Croydon, supra note 69, at 29. 
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reconcile national political reality with new regional obligation[s] to 
promote and protect human rights. The ASEAN human rights body 
is expected to be “realistic,” “credible,” “workable,” “effective,” 
“evolving” and most importantly “acceptable” to all member 
states . . . . As such, the ASEAN human rights body is never 
intended to be a stand-alone independent entity—let alone an 
autonomous regional watchdog with “sharp teeth.”84 
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo stated that instead, the 
body would “at least have a tongue[,] and a tongue will have its uses.”85 
Scholars have diverging views regarding ASEAN’s motivations for 
creating an ASEAN human rights body. Some believe that ASEAN created 
the ASEAN Commission in order to obtain international legitimacy and 
appease the outside world.86 ASEAN states could also be motivated by the 
fear that the human rights movement, particularly the push for political and 
civil rights, could lead to domestic instability and forced democratization.87 
Others warned that, in institutionalizing the ASEAN Commission, ASEAN 
could “imprison”88 human rights in “a controlled bureaucratic 
environment.”89 This allows ASEAN to “deflect[] criticism by discussing 
human rights in a safe political space [where] . . . government officials 
control the pace and content of the discourse.”90 However, the ASEAN 
Commission could also constitute an important first step towards stronger 
protection of human rights and help to solidify norms.91 
The plausible, if troubling, view is that ASEAN chose to create the 
ASEAN Commission to relieve pressure for real change. The ASEAN 
Commission’s deliberately weak institutional design seems to be a 
placating statement with no real effect.92 Such disingenuous participation 
 
 84.  Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 713. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Munro, supra note 81, at 24; see also Christof Heyns & Magnus Kilander, Towards Minimum 
Standards For Regional Human Rights Systems, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W MICHAEL REISMAN 31 (2010) (arguing that the ASEAN 
Commission could shield governments from criticism for human rights violations rather than prevent 
violations given the absence of independent authority and oversight); Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the 
Gap? The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIAN-PAC. 
L. & POL’Y J. 174, 176 (2011) (identifying the danger that the ASEAN Commission could undermine, 
instead of complement, international human rights standards). 
 87.  Ciorciari, supra note 66, at 701. 
 88.  Id. at 720. 
 89.  Id. at 697. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  This is analogous to Oona Hathaway’s view that states participate in treaties and human rights 
regimes because weak international enforcement mechanisms allow states to pay lip service to human 
rights without fulfilling the commitments. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do human rights treaties make a 
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might backfire if CSOs can hold governments locally accountable.93 This is 
because international civil society could increase recognition, reporting, 
and publicity of local violations, thereby creating more pressure on 
governments to address human rights problems.94 However, this requires a 
tight link between the governments and international civil society,95 which 
may be absent in the ASEAN region. 
3. Significance of the ASEAN Declaration  
The ASEAN Commission has done little since its establishment in 
2009, apart from overseeing the drafting of the ASEAN Declaration. The 
ASEAN Declaration is not the product of a democratic process. Rather, the 
drafting process was “controversial” because of the ASEAN Commission’s 
lack of independence, the lack of transparency, and exclusion of CSOs 
from the process.96 An optimistic interpretation of the ASEAN Declaration 
is that it constitutes “another step towards the development of a human 
rights architecture”97 and undermines ASEAN’s claim that human rights is 
a Western imposition.98 
However, the text of the ASEAN Declaration arguably falls below 
international standards for human rights.99 Although the ASEAN 
Declaration’s preamble reaffirms ASEAN’s commitment to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other international obligations,100 the 
Declaration broadly limits all rights and fails to include several basic 
rights.101 This has caused civil society to denounce it.102 The ASEAN 
 
difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 2005 (2002). 
 93.  Emilie Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox 
of empty promises, 110 AM. J. SOCIOL. 1373, 1385–86 (2005); H. SMITH-CANNOY, INSINCERE 
COMMITMENTS: HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, ABUSIVE STATES, AND CITIZEN ACTIVISM 174–75 (2012). 
 94.  Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 93, at 1386. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Renshaw, supra note 15, at 2. No drafts of the ASEAN Declaration were made public, 
although two of them were leaked. Id. 
 97.  Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 58. 
 98.  See Renshaw, supra note 15, at 23. 
 99.  See U.N. Daily News, U.N. Official Welcomes ASEAN Commitment to Human Rights, but 
Concerned Over Declaration Wording, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.un. 
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43536#.Upqyf41Q2XR. 
 100.  ASEAN DECLARATION, supra note 15. 
 101.  Human Rights Watch, Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/1 
9/civil-society-denounces-adoption-flawed-asean-human-rights-declaration (last visited July 12, 2014) 
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. Article 8 of the ASEAN Declaration is a general principle that 
could limit all rights, including non-derogable ones under international law. Renshaw, supra note 15, at 
13. The ASEAN Declaration excludes the right to self-determination, the rights of indigenous peoples, 
id., and the right to freedom of association. 
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Declaration also leaves unresolved the awkward tension between the 
aspiration to endorse universal human rights and the reluctance to cede 
state sovereignty.103 The ramifications of this ambivalence could be severe. 
As one scholar’s scathing criticism of ASEAN Declaration explains: 
ASEAN’s human rights initiative, far from facilitating ASEAN 
States’ compliance with treaty and customary human rights 
obligations, has been, and is likely to remain, ineffective and even 
antagonistic . . . . The [ASEAN Declaration] is a declaratory 
statement which purports to fragment the human rights norms 
recognized by some ASEAN States between the intra- and extra- 
ASEAN context . . . . [T]he [ASEAN Declaration] does not achieve 
a local-global reconciliation but rather an ossification of their 
skeptical position on human rights with little evidence of “novel” 
rights reflecting “regional particularities.”104 
The adoption of a regional instrument that plausibly undermines 
international human rights standards is likely to complicate the ASEAN 
Commission’s work in the future. It is difficult to promote and expand on 
an instrument that is contested and contains fractured legal standards. If the 
ASEAN Declaration were to evolve into a binding convention, as some 
soft-law declarations do,105 its fractured standards have to be clarified so 
that it could be implemented in accordance with universal standards. These 
challenges, in addition to others described in the following section, mean 
that it is unlikely that the ASEAN Declaration will turn into a binding 
convention in the short run. 
C. Challenges to establishing an effective human rights framework in 
ASEAN 
1. Principle of non-interference and ASEAN’s modus operandi  
The region espouses an “extreme deference to state sovereignty 
understood in almost absolutist terms.”106 The principle of non-interference 
in states’ domestic affairs is explicitly included in the ASEAN 
Commission’s terms of reference107 and the ASEAN Charter.108 Many 
 
 102.  Human Rights Watch, supra note 101. 
 103.  Renshaw, supra note 15, at 578. 
 104.  Doyle, supra note 15, at 98. 
 105.  Soft-law declarations sometimes pave the way for binding instruments. For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights evolved into the legally binding International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 106.  JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 179 (4th ed. 2013). 
 107.  Heyns & Kilander, supra note 86, at 30; ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 2.1. 
 108.  Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN CHARTER, art. 2.2(e) (Nov. 20, 2007), 
available at http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. 
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scholars identify this principle as a major challenge for regional human 
rights in ASEAN,109 as states are neither willing to criticize nor receive 
criticism. In addition, the “ASEAN way” of doing business through 
consultation and consensus110—read: veto power by each state—further 
restrains when and how ASEAN and the ASEAN Commission can act. 
Diverse political, cultural, and economic positions within the region make 
forming consensus around norms difficult.111 The result is a reluctance to 
impose sanctions on deviant members, slow decision-making process, and 
a weak ASEAN Commission. Further, most ASEAN states have rejected 
alternative methods of decision-making such as constructive and flexible 
engagement.112 Thus, the proposed framework would likely have to work 
within the constraints of the current ASEAN method of consensus 
decision-making and persuasion. 
2. ASEAN’s views on human rights: cultural relativism and Asian 
values   
As Singapore has declared, rights are “contested concepts.”113 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia promoted the principal cultural 
relativist objection to the universality of human rights using Asian values, 
 
 109.  Thio, supra note 19, at 6 (identifying non-interference as a “cardinal principle” for ASEAN); 
John Arendshorst, The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN 
Charter, 8 NW. UJ INT’L HUM. RTS. 102, 115 (2009); Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 237; Saul et al., 
supra note 11, at 35. However, some have argued that adherence to the non-interference principle has 
weakened because the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 exposed the need for interdependence and 
regional integration. Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 110.  Hsien-Li Tan, The ASEAN Human Rights Body: Incorporating Forgotten Promises for Policy 
Coherence and Efficacy, 12 SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 239, 240 (2008). 
 111.  Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 217; Renshaw, supra note 15, at 577; Saul et al., supra note 
11, at 28. 
 112.  Thio, supra note 19, at 53–54. Although it is unclear whether Malaysia or Thailand is 
responsible for first suggesting each concept, they are the only two ASEAN states that advocate for 
these concepts. Compare id. (attributing constructive engagement to Malaysia and flexible engagement 
to Thailand), with Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 57 (attributing constructive engagement to 
Thailand and flexible engagement to Mayalsia but confirming that besides Malaysia and Thailand, all 
ASEAN states have rejected these concepts since 1999). As opposed to nonintervention, constructive 
engagement is a “more proactive response to manage the spill[]over effects of certain domestic . . . 
crises . . . though ‘constructive intervention’ to prevent the escalation of problems.” Thio, supra note 
19, at 53.  Flexible engagement asserts that non-interference is not an absolute principle, and allows 
states to openly criticize other states’ domestic policies when these policies have transnational effects 
that impact them. Id. at 53–54. 
 113.  Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations, U.N. G.A. 60th Sess. High-level Plen. 
Mtg. (Sep. 16, 2005), http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements16/sin050916eng.pdf (“[A]ll 
but a handful of what are asserted to be rights are still essentially contested concepts.”); see Durbach, 
supra note 43, at 224; TAN, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting Singapore as stating that “the interpretation of 
most rights is still essentially contested concepts [sic]” at the Seventh Workshop on the ASEAN 
Regional Mechanism on Human Rights in 2008). 
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which first appeared in the international spotlight through the Bangkok 
Declaration, right before the 1993 Vienna Conference.114 The Bangkok 
Declaration was a document signed by over forty Asian states.115 It stated 
what has now come to be the Asian values position, which calls for 
attention to regional and cultural particularity as opposed to the universality 
of human rights.116 To the extent that regions possess generalizable cultural 
values, Asia values “communitarian, family-centered and non-
individualistic belief systems,” whereas the West values “egalitarianism, 
individualism and liberal democratic beliefs.”117 The Asian values position 
highlights that human rights is a Western concept, and thus a form of “post-
colonial, cultural imperialism.”118 Asian values proponents use culture 
“both to assert an exception, or opposition, to a certain type of human 
rights and to argue that international law should protect their culture.”119 
Although some ASEAN countries have attempted to characterize this 
contestation as coming from ASEAN or Asia as a singular bloc that shares 
Asian values, neither the Asian nor ASEAN region observes one set of 
homogenous Asian Values or espouses one particular conception of human 
rights.120 Even within countries that champion Asian Values, perspectives 
on human rights diverge.121 Although some scholars argue that relativism 
may be receding,122 the ASEAN Declaration contains language to the 
contrary.123 Thus, it is uncertain whether the ASEAN Declaration has lain 
to rest the cultural relativism debate.124 
3. Lack of political will   
The history of ASEAN’s interaction with human rights shows that the 
 
 114.  Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: the Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 291, 311 (1999). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  BADEN OFFORD, HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2003). 
 118.  Id. at 32. 
 119.  Engle, supra note 114, at 312. 
 120.  Saul et al., supra note 11, at 28–31. 
 121.  For example, Singapore has been a vociferous champion of Asian Values, and has insisted 
that human rights are Western concepts. OFFORD, supra note 117, at 5–6. However, Chee Soon Juan, 
Secretary General of the Singapore Democratic Party (an opposition party) has exerted that “the longing 
for equality, justice, and freedom is not Asian or Western—it is primordial.”  Id. at 41. 
 122.  Linton, supra note 75, at 482. 
 123.  See supra Part I.B.3. 
 124.  A member of the Philippines drafting team described the ASEAN Declaration as the ASEAN 
Magna Carta that finally ends the remnant of cultural relativism, but the U.S. State Department objects 
to the ASEAN Declaration precisely on the grounds that it endorses cultural relativism. Renshaw, supra 
note 15, at 558–59. 
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primary reason for a weak ASEAN human rights system is deeper than a 
simple lack of capacity to implement. Rather, it is a lack of political will. 
The process for developing a human rights system for the region has been 
described as a “long and winding road.”125 ASEAN has a long history of 
producing declarations126 without the appetite for binding human rights 
instruments. The ASEAN Commission is institutionally weak, but not for a 
lack of trying. Many prior proposals to shape the ASEAN Commission’s 
powers have failed. For example, “proposals for a commission that 
constituted comprehensive human rights protection and reporting 
mechanisms had been denied by authoritarian ASEAN member states.”127 
The Working Group asked for a commission with both protective and 
promotional functions, but the ASEAN Commission was restricted to only 
promotional functions.128 Member states also refused the Working Group’s 
request for a concrete timeframe for the ASEAN Commission’s growth and 
evolution.129 The states also refused to allow elected representatives to be 
independent from member states,130 instead reserving the right to remove 
them at will.131 Even though the NHRIs of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand recommended that the ASEAN Commission be 
empowered to conduct country visits,132 the states did not include this 
ability in the ASEAN Commission’s mandate. The lack of political will for 
 
 125.  Vitit Muntarbhorn, A Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (May 28–29, 2003), 
http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberallibrary/roadmap-for-asean-human-rights.htm (last visited July 12, 2014). 
 126.  See Petcharamesree, supra note 24, at 47–48 (describing a series of non-binding documents 
produced by ASEAN that mention human rights). 
 127.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 164. 
 128.  WORKING GRP. FOR AN ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM, Proposed Elements for the 
Terms of Reference of an ASEAN Human Rights Body, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/WGsub 
missiontoHLP.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Working Group Proposal]; see WORKING 
GRP. FOR AN ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM, Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism Welcomes the Imminent Creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/creation-of-asean-intergovernmental-commission.htm (last 
visited July 12, 2014) (“It is apparent that the current [ASEAN Commission Terms of Reference] is not 
what we aspired for.”). 
 129.  The Working Group stated that there should be a “credible timeframe for every stage of the 
evolutionary process” of the ASEAN Commission. Working Group Proposal, supra note 128, ¶ 19. 
 130.  Maruah Singapore, a human rights NGO in Singapore, proposed that the representatives 
should “act as principals in their own right and not as representatives of their states.” Maruah 
Singapore, Position Paper on the Proposed ASEAN Human Right Body ¶ 33–34 (Sep. 9, 2008), 
http://maruahsg.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/maruah-position-paper-10-sept-2008.pdf. 
 131.  ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 5.6. 
 132.  Human Rights Nat’l Comm’n of Indon. [Komnas HAM], Human Rights Comm’n of Malay. 
[SUHAKAM], Comm’n on Human Rights of the Phil. [CHRP] & Nat’l Human Rights Comm’n of 
Thai. [NHRCT], Position Paper of the National Human Rights Institutions of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand on Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Human Rights Body 2 (Sep. 11, 2008), 
available at http://seanf.asia/index.php/component/attachments/download/33. 
14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  9:48 PM 
2015] CONTEXTUALIZING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 401 
strong mechanisms directly limits the feasibility of proposals for the 
ASEAN Commission, and this Note’s recommendations are made in light 
of ASEAN’s tendency to reject proposals. 
II. LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIONAL SYSTEMS 
Designing a human rights framework suitable for ASEAN also 
requires a survey of other Regional Systems, with a particular focus on how 
well they have worked and why. The three main Regional Systems—
European, Inter-American, and African—have all adopted a three-pronged 
combination: convention, commission, and court.133 Some have argued that 
a Regional System requires, at the very least, the three-pronged 
combination in order to be complete.134 This is because conventions spell 
out the terms of states’ commitments, commissions promote and monitor 
implementation, and courts adjudicate disputes and enforce the 
convention.135 The European Regional System has seen much success using 
this framework.136 The Inter-American and African Regional Systems have 
also benefited from the framework,137 though they are still works in 
progress, as there have been some instances of state non-compliance.138 
It is important to note that Regional Systems evolve over time and do 
not apply the same standards and mechanisms to all countries, especially in 
their early years.139 The three main Regional Systems did not adopt the 
three-pronged combination from the outset.140 Instead, the progressive 
 
 133.  Tan, supra note 110, at 244. As the European System evolved, it merged its commission into 
its court. John G. Merrills, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/196097/European-Court-of-Human-Rights-ECHR. 
 134.  See, e.g., Maruah Singapore, supra note 130, at 4. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See HaoDuy Phan, The Evolution Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Body, 9 ASIA-PAC. J. ON 
HUM. RTS. & L. 1, 1 (2008) (arguing that experiences from Europe, Latin America, and Africa show 
that Regional Systems bring more good news than bad, and the sooner a mechanism is put into effect, 
the more the population benefits from it). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  For an examination of non-compliance within the Inter-American system, see Alexandra 
Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 504 (describing the implementation crisis of the Inter-
American system). For an example of non-compliance within the African system, see infra note 162–
163 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177 (noting that the Inter-American and African 
systems “did not appear fully formed” but “represent a slow evolution of diverse views towards 
consensus.”); see also PHAN, supra note 17, at 171 (observing that participating in the Inter-American, 
European, and African Courts were optional for member states, and thus the courts only had jurisdiction 
over some but not all member states in the courts’ early years). 
 140.  For the European system, the convention first entered into force in 1953, then the commission 
was established in 1954, followed by the court in 1959, and in 1998, the commission merged into the 
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introduction of each prong took a significant period of time.141 
For example, it took France, Greece, and Switzerland twenty-four 
years to ratify the European Convention.142 The legally binding American 
Convention only came into force thirty years after the American 
Declaration, which eleven Organization of American States (OAS) 
members have not yet ratified.143 The African Charter establishing the 
African Commission was adopted eighteen years after the Organization of 
African Unity (now African Union) was established.144 When the European 
Convention entered into force in 1953, only two countries recognized the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) jurisdiction, and the Court did 
not receive the required number of recognitions to exist until six years 
later.145 In addition, there is no fixed order for introducing the three prongs. 
For example, the Inter-American Commission operated for about ten years 
without a convention through successfully applying a non-binding 
declaration.146 
All of the systems first implemented the least intrusive mechanisms 
and incrementally progressed to the strongest mechanism—the court.147 For 
example, the Inter-American Commission had weak mechanisms during its 
initial years, but later used its ability to publish reports to forcefully indict 
and investigate member governments,148 and even heads of states.149 Even 
when the courts were eventually introduced, they did not apply to all 
member countries, but rather only to the subset that had consented through 
optional protocols.150 The regional courts also started out with limited 
 
court. PHAN, supra note 17, at 162–63. The African system started with the African Charter as its 
substantive instrument (adopted in 1981), which established the African Commission, and more than 
two decades later, the African Court was established in 2004. Catherine Renshaw, Understanding the 
New ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: The Limits and Potential of Theory 18 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=170 
6451. The Inter-American system started with the American Declaration in 1948, established the 
commission in 1959 and then a decade later adopted the convention that created the court. PHAN, supra 
note 17, at 165 n.179, 165–67. 
 141.  See supra note 140. 
 142.  PHAN, supra note 17, at 162. 
 143.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 96. 
 144.  Renshaw, supra note 140. 
 145.  PHAN, supra note 17, at 163. 
 146.  Id. at 167. 
 147.  See supra note 140. 
 148.  See Tom J Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a 
Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 510–12 (1997). 
 149.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 172. 
 150.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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accessibility.151 Even the now-powerful ECHR did not accept individual 
complaints directly until 1998, and before then, it was part of a two-tiered 
system in which cases were funneled through a commission before 
reaching the Court.152 
Some scholars have proposed guidelines for Regional Systems based 
on the three main Regional Systems’ best practices and commonalities,153 
which the ASEAN Commission could adopt. There are several lessons 
from the European experience. First, the most effective institutions “rely on 
prior sociological, ideological and institutional convergence toward 
common norms.”154 Second, the binding constraint on human rights 
enforcement is the lack of consensus rather than weak institutions.155 
Lastly, while waiting for a supranational court, “promising strategies may 
be to strengthen domestic civil society and political institutions, and to 
strengthen traditional international organizations that gather information 
and arrange consultations.”156 
However, of the three main Regional Systems, the African and Inter-
American systems are perhaps more useful because these regions share 
many similarities with Southeast Asia, including “high diversity of political 
regimes, different levels of economic development, and some serious 
human rights problems.”157 The African regional system is the newest and 
weakest of the three main systems,158 and has faced challenges most similar 
to those of the ASEAN system.  Its substantive instrument, the African 
Charter, is “riddled with clawback clauses that weaken the protection” of 
human rights, emphasize individual duties, and advances the idea of 
collective people’s rights.159 African states also espoused firm notions of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention in the 1960s and 1970s, during 
which the Organization of African Unity ignored alleged human rights 
violations in member states based on the principle of non-interference.160 
 
 151.  See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Individuals still do not have standing to file 
petitions directly with the Inter-American and African courts. Simone Wegmann, Regional Human 
Rights Systems—A Comparative Analysis, GENEVA LABORATORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 25, 28 
(2012), available at http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/Publications/GreenLab/Wegmann.pdf. 
 152.  See Wegmann, supra note 151, at 25–26. 
 153.  See Heyns & Kilander, supra note 86, at 25–27. 
 154.  Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and 
Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 157, 178 (1995). 
 155.  Id. at 181. 
 156.  Id. at 182. 
 157.  PHAN, supra note 17, at 161. 
 158.  See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 98. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 156–58 (2d ed. 2012). 
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Yet, despite these difficulties, the African Commission has helped nudge 
African states towards accepting the legitimacy of regional scrutiny.161 
Nevertheless, Africa’s experience also cautions against using overly 
strong mechanisms before the time is ripe. For example, in 2011, the 
government of Libya used brutal force against civilian protestors in 
contravention of international human rights and humanitarian law.162 The 
African Court’s provisional measures against Libya were “completely 
ignored,”163 and although the Court’s measures indicate that it will play an 
important role in addressing Africa’s human rights crises,164 this incidence 
shows that the risk of noncompliance is real when states lack commitment. 
When states consent to the court’s jurisdiction without the requisite intent 
to follow through, the Regional System needs to turn to other actors to 
intervene, a conditionality that may not be realized for less egregious 
violations. States’ perpetual delinquency could result in the 
institutionalization of noncompliance, detracting from the purpose of the 
Regional System. In sum, political will could be the single most important 
contributor to a strong Regional System.165 Though the institution of 
mechanisms should not always be conservative, it should at least be 
informed by the sufficiency of the political will to comply with them. 
III. AN INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR ASEAN 
There is hope that the ASEAN Commission will be strengthened in 
the coming years, since its terms of reference were due for review in 
2014,166 and civil society and experts have advocated for stronger 
protection mandates.167 So far, no changes have been made to the terms of 
reference, and Myanmar is only likely to conduct the review in 2016.168 
 
 161.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99.  This progress can also be attributed to the agitation caused 
by several dictators’ human rights abuses, concern for human rights in international politics, and the 
democratization of some African states. VILJOEN, supra note 160, at 158–59. For the evolutionary 
process of the regional human rights framework in Africa, see id. at 151–69. 
 162.  Dan Juma, Provisional Measures Under The African Human Rights System: The African 
Court’s Order Against Libya, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 344, 364 (2012). 
 163.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99. 
 164.  Juma, supra note 162, at 373. 
 165.  Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: a Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 636 
(1986). 
 166.  The ASEAN Commission’s terms of reference was due for review five years after its entry 
into force. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 9.6. The terms of reference entered into 
force in 2009. TAN, supra note 1, at 157. 
 167.  Nyan Lynn Aung, Calls Grow For Review Of Regional Human Rights Body, MYNAMAR 
TIMES (July 4, 2014), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10894-calls-grow-for-review-
of-regional-human-rights-body.html. 
 168.  Id. 
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ASEAN’s regional framework must strike a difficult balance between 
being sufficiently tailored to local conditions while avoiding “the kind of 
arbitrary, political interpretation of actions that leads to human rights 
violations in the first place.”169 The framework proposed below is not 
intended to be the infallible or ultimate model. Rather, it is an attempt to 
contribute to the ongoing effort to find the right balance, which is an 
ambitious project, to say the very least. 
Current research concerning the ASEAN human rights system 
recognizes the importance of an evolutionary approach.170 Indeed, the 
Working Group recommends an evolutionary process for the ASEAN 
Commission’s development, where the Commission would initially address 
only women and children’s rights and its findings will not be binding.171 
However, many other suggestions and ideas are thrown into the field 
without a comprehensive evaluation of how they could work together. 
Suggestions range from adopting only soft mechanisms to a full-fledged 
ASEAN court of human rights.172 Implementing a range of mechanisms by 
trial and error without delving into the complicated behavioral logic, 
effectiveness, and causality theories may seem harmless. However, this 
approach may undermine the system’s purpose.173 Sequencing and careful 
selection of mechanisms is important because some strategies could 
potentially be incompatible when used in combination. For example, 
coercive tactics can undercut efforts to foster acculturation.174 
This Note seeks to harness the processes of state socialization to 
improve regime design, and adopts Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ 
integrated model of state socialization.175 There are three processes of 
social influence through which states and institutions may change the 
behavior of other states: material inducement, persuasion, and 
 
 169.  Thio, supra note 19, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170.  See Renshaw, supra note 144, at 18 (“ASEAN would not be the first of the world’s regional 
human rights bodies to achieve an effective human rights body by accretion, not design.”); Aguirre & 
Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177 (observing that other Regional Systems slowly evolved into what they 
are today). 
 171.  Working Group Proposal, supra note 128, ¶ 17–18. 
 172.  See Aung, supra note 167 (“[T]here were two schools of direction in reviewing and amending 
the terms of reference of [the ASEAN Commission]. The first one was making a radical change and the 
second was using the existing terms with creative interpretation.”); PHAN, supra note 17 at 5 
(recommending an ASEAN Court of Human Rights); Thio, supra note 19, at 78–79 (recommending 
softer mechanisms such as publicity and persuasion and arguing that a court is not likely to emerge in 
the foreseeable future). 
 173.  See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, 123–24. 
 174.  See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 175.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at ch.9. 
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acculturation.176 Material inducement involves using material rewards and 
punishments to change the behavior of states, and does not necessarily 
change the underlying preferences of the target state.177 Persuasion occurs 
when states are convinced of the “truth, validity, or appropriateness of a 
norm, belief, or practice,” and change their minds to internalize the 
norm.178 Acculturation is where states mimic the beliefs and behavior of the 
surrounding culture, “without actively assessing either the merits of those 
beliefs and behaviors or the material costs and benefits of conforming to 
them.”179 Acculturation is driven by cognitive and social pressures to 
conform to a reference group, and may lead to outward conformity with a 
norm without privately accepting the norm or changing private practices.180 
The current ASEAN Regional System is likely the result of 
acculturation.181 ASEAN created the ASEAN Commission in part to catch 
up with the development of Regional Systems in the rest of the world, but 
the Commission is institutionally weak by design and the ASEAN 
Declaration seeks to redefine human rights from an ASEAN perspective. 
This indicates that ASEAN created its Regional System mainly due to 
acculturative pressures to conform to human rights developments in the rest 
of the world, without completely internalizing or agreeing with the 
substance of universal human rights norms. This decoupling of formal 
structures from internal demands is an empirical indicator of 
acculturation.182 Specifically, the current ASEAN Regional System exhibits 
category two decoupling—public conformity to global human rights that is 
disconnected from local practices because of incomplete acceptance.183 A 
major concern is that acculturation is unable to eliminate this decoupling, 
leaving a perpetual gap between nominal commitment and actual 
implementation.184 
However, although acculturation can result in seemingly shallow or 
disingenuous commitment to universal human rights, it can also translate 
them into meaningful changes over time.185 That is, decoupling need not be 
a permanent stage, but rather the first step towards deeper, progressive 
 
 176.  Id. at 22. 
 177.  Id. at 23. 
 178.  Id. at 24. 
 179.  Id. at 22. 
 180.  Id. at 27–28. 
 181.  See Munro, supra note 81, at 22. 
 182.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 43. 
 183.  Id. at 140–41. 
 184.  Id. at 136. 
 185.  Id. at 136–37. 
14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  9:48 PM 
2015] CONTEXTUALIZING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 407 
change.186 Acculturative pressures can continue to compel actors toward 
conformity in the post-adoption, implementation stage.187 Furthermore, 
several processes can translate shallow commitments into meaningful 
adoption of the global human rights model.188 These include shifts in 
political opportunity structure, the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,” 
escalating demands of global civil society, and state learning.189 The 
proposed framework incorporates these processes to accelerate progression. 
If these processes fail to eliminate decoupling, the framework suggests 
harnessing other socialization processes such as persuasion and material 
inducement to reduce the gap between formal commitment and actual 
practice, after acculturation has inspired commitment to human rights.190 
The proposed framework does not necessarily sacrifice effectiveness 
for political feasibility. Given ASEAN’s resistance towards adversarial or 
coercive intrusions into state sovereignty and a lack of political will for 
establishing binding enforcement mechanisms, the ASEAN Commission 
should start by engaging governments using mechanisms that appear least 
intrusive to state sovereignty. Some may argue that we should not give up 
on pushing for stronger mechanisms just because it is politically difficult. 
Indeed, material inducements signal that the community condemns the 
proscribed behavior, and the absence of punishment might signal that the 
community does not strongly support the norm.191 However, this expressive 
value of punishment might work only when the proscribed behavior is 
already “broadly, unequivocally, and manifestly understood as 
inappropriate.”192 Premature punishment, prior to the institutionalization of 
a norm, “can also result in a (greater) backlash by norm violators who feel 
unjustly penalized.”193 Linking information about state violation to 
penalties can also force such information underground, incentivizing states 
to conceal the very information that would be useful to acculturation and 
persuasion.194 Thus, material inducement and strong mechanisms may not 
necessarily be the best strategies for inducing compliance.195 Instead, under 
certain conditions, “soft law” mechanisms could be more effective in 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 156. 
 188.  Id. at 144. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 160. 
 191.  Id. at 175–76. 
 192.  Id. at 176. 
 193.  Id. at 181. 
 194.  Id. at 126. 
 195.  Id. at 123. 
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establishing durable norms196 that persist even in the absence of material 
inducement.197 Thus, progressing from softer mechanisms to stronger ones 
is not just born out of political necessity but also congruent with 
institutional design theories and effectiveness. 
The proposed framework evolves in stages of increasing strength as 
sociocultural and ideological consensus builds around protection, and not 
just promotion of human rights. This allows acculturation to serve as the 
precursor to persuasion and material inducement, enhancing the 
effectiveness of the latter two processes.198 After a global model is adopted 
by states through acculturation, social movements can persuade 
governments to uphold their commitments by framing their cause as 
“congruent with human rights principles that are now part of the nation’s 
existing value system.”199 Acculturation can also “develop community-
wide schema—for the evaluation of human rights standards, legal 
violations, and acceptable justifications—thus sharpening the framework 
needed by a system of material incentives to operate most effectively.”200 
Indeed, the evolutionary path of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its member states exhibits that the “delayed onset of material 
inducement” can be beneficial.201 
The Regional System should avoid reliance on a single entity—the 
ASEAN Commission. Gaps due to normative dissensus (category two 
decoupling) may require exposing multiple levels of society to global 
models of “appropriate human rights behavior.”202 Engaging multiple 
complementary channels of influence and increasing coordination between 
them is essential to build support inside and outside ASEAN to create push 
and pull effects203 that effectively change state behavior. The push and pull 
effect is analogized from the Keynesian economic concepts of cost-push 
inflation and demand-pull inflation.204 In ASEAN’s human rights context, 
it refers to pressures from ASEAN’s internal and external spheres that 
“reinforce[] an equilibrium-imperative upon ASEAN to reject impunity by 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. at 129. 
 198.  See id. at 165, 182. 
 199.  See id. at 165. 
 200.  See id. at 182. 
 201.  Id.; see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 314–17 (1997). 
 202.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 161. 
 203.  This Note builds on push and pull effects proposed in Diane A. Desierto, Universalizing Core 
Human Rights in the “New” ASEAN: A Reassessment of Culture and Development Justifications 
Against the Global Rejection of Impunity, 1 GO ̈TTINGEN J. INT’L LAW 77, 86 (2009). 
 204.  Id. 
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‘universalizing’ core human rights norms.”205 
In sum, the framework recommends a strategic sequence of human 
rights mechanisms and procedural reforms for the ASEAN Commission 
complemented by other actors that work along with or independently of the 
Commission. Section A contains the proposal for the ASEAN 
Commission’s stages of evolution, while Section B proposes strategies 
other actors and institutions can adopt to complement the ASEAN 
Commission. 
A. Proposal for the evolution of the ASEAN Commission 
A preliminary task for the ASEAN Commission is to assert itself in 
the norm-building process. Standards must be unified before they can be 
promoted and implemented through human rights mechanisms. By using its 
promotional mandate to uphold international human rights standards and 
enhance regional cooperation,206 the ASEAN Commission could draft 
general comments (as treaty monitoring bodies do)207 that give quasi-
authoritative interpretations of the ASEAN Declaration in a progressive 
manner that is at least consistent with international human rights standards.  
General comments are important, especially given the need to unify and 
clarify the ASEAN Declaration’s fractured standards. The ASEAN 
Commission should also consider creative alternatives for norm creation, 
such as mainstreaming, if it meets roadblocks through traditional 
methods.208 
The proposed plan for the ASEAN Commission is divided into human 
rights mechanisms and procedural reforms. These can be implemented 
independently and at different times, though they would serve to 
complement each other. Some of these reforms can be within the 
Commission’s existing mandate, but most would require further action by 
ASEAN member states. Procedural reforms may be easier to implement 
because they may entail fewer sovereignty costs and do not require 
substantive reforms. They also increase access to information and 
participation by other actors, which may spur the adoption of human rights 
mechanisms. The human rights mechanisms promote, monitor, or 
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  See ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 1.5–1.6. 
 207.  See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 83–84. 
 208.  Id. at 87–88.  Mainstreaming is the process in which “human rights penetrate arenas of action 
that previously did not explicitly consider human rights questions.” Id. at 88.  For example, some 
organizations that do not have explicit human rights mandates, such as the World Health Organization 
and the World Bank, engage in human rights work and employ human rights language, thus spreading 
human rights norms though non-explicit processes. Id. at 87–88. 
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implement human rights standards and are intended to be evolutionary; 
they can be implemented sequentially, independently, and progressively 
(not just over time). 
1. Procedural reforms  
The ASEAN Commission can reform (1) access to information and 
(2) participation. 209  However, ASEAN may be unwilling to incorporate 
them as formal rights.210 Nevertheless, the procedural reforms could still be 
gradually incorporated as more informal guidelines and processes in the 
existing ASEAN Commission protocol. 
First, the ASEAN Commission could expand access to information for 
CSOs and the public. Currently, ASEAN has a set of guidelines for how 
CSOs and ASEAN can interact.211 These guidelines provide that qualifying 
CSOs may have access to official ASEAN documentation on a selective 
basis, and some documentation such as declarations and policy statements 
are available to the public through the ASEAN website.212 However, 
internal decision-making and discussions at the ASEAN Commission are 
kept secret and released only in the form of press releases.213 The ASEAN 
Commission should create channels through which the public and CSOs 
can request for more information, and also make decision-making 
processes more transparent by providing access to meeting minutes.214 
Second, ASEAN could relax the rules on participation for CSOs and 
the public. Currently, qualifying CSOs can submit written statements or 
recommendations on policy issues to ASEAN and participate in ASEAN 
 
 209.  These procedural reforms build on the three pillars of procedural rights outlined in the Aarhus 
Convention. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered 
into force Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]; see Aarhus Convention: About the 
Convention: Content, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, http://www.unece.org/ 
env/pp/contentofaarhus.html (last visited February 27, 2015) (explaining the three “pillars” of 
procedural rights in the Aarhus Convention); see also Tarik Abdel-Monem, ASEAN’s Gradual 
Evolution: Challenges and opportunities for integrating Participatory Procedural Reforms For The 
Environment In An Evolving Rights-based Framework, 29 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 234, 259 (2012) 
(suggesting application of the Aarhus Convention to the ASEAN Commission). The Aarhus Convention 
includes a third pillar, justice, which will not be discussed here because it requires creation of judicial or 
administrative procedures that mostly overlap with the human rights mechanisms suggested infra Part 
III.A.2. 
 210.  Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 270–71. 
 211.  ASEAN, Guidelines on ASEAN’s Relations with Civil Society Organizations, http://www.uni-
global-post.org/upload/meeting_in_manila_verweis8.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 212.  Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 272. 
 213.  Id. at 273. 
 214.  Id. at 273–74. 
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meetings at ASEAN’s discretion.215 To qualify, CSOs have to be officially 
affiliated with ASEAN and must “advance ASEAN interests and promote 
the awareness of ASEAN’s principles and activities.”216 Critics have 
observed that state governments created many of these qualified CSOs, 
whose participation in dialogues is merely a symbolic gesture.217 To date, 
the Working Group is the only human rights CSO affiliated with 
ASEAN.218 ASEAN should allow more CSOs to qualify for participation in 
its decision-making processes. At the very least, the ASEAN Commission 
could give CSOs observer status in its meetings. In addition, the ASEAN 
Commission could allow the public or CSOs to submit written comments 
about their concerns and member state practices, and make these 
submissions publicly available.219 This could function as CSO-driven 
annual reporting to the ASEAN Commission on human rights issues.220 
Although the Terms of Reference for the ASEAN Commission do not 
mention participation rights, the ASEAN Charter explicitly refers to 
principles allowing for public participation in ASEAN community 
building.221 The state-appointed internal advisory committee for ASEAN—
the Eminent Persons Group—has also recommended that ASEAN enhance 
the participation of CSOs, academic institutions, and Parliamentarians in 
ASEAN Member States (AIPA).222 Thus, these procedural changes could 
have sufficient support to be feasible in the short term. 
2. Human rights mechanisms  
The existing Regional Systems show that the strength of a Regional 
System is the consequence, not cause, of the strength of national 
governments’ commitment.223 Also, there is an inherent tradeoff between 
the scope and strength of mechanisms; the wider the scope of countries 
covered, the weaker the mechanism.224 The ASEAN Commission has a 
wide scope of coverage; ASEAN prefers the inclusionary approach where 
all member states participate in the ASEAN Commission,225 which covers a 
 
 215.  Id. at 274–75. 
 216.  Id. at 275. 
 217.  Id. at 275–76. 
 218.  ASEAN, supra note 53 at Annex 2. 
 219.  Abdel-Monem, supra note 209, at 276. 
 220.  Id. at 276–77. 
 221.  Id. at 269–70 (quoting the preamble of the Charter and other articles on the purpose of 
ASEAN). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 99, 108. 
 224.  Id. at 110–11. 
 225.  See PHAN, supra note 17, at 233. 
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broad range of human rights issues. Consequently, the strength of the 
mechanisms will be limited.226 
Thus, even though strong mechanisms such as regional courts would 
seem ideal for any Regional System, the ASEAN Commission should start 
with less intrusive, non-judicial mechanisms. The ASEAN Commission 
may be more successful if it engages governments in ways that appear less 
intrusive to state sovereignty, and then develop the system in stages. As 
other Regional Systems did not become strong overnight, the ASEAN 
Commission “would not be the first of the world’s regional human rights 
bodies to achieve an effective human rights body by accretion, not 
design.”227 
The following table describes human rights mechanisms that could be 
adopted for the ASEAN system over time, in order of increasing strength. 
 
Human 
Rights 
Mechanisms 
Description 
Publishing 
best practices 
Apart from influencing the standardization of norms,228 
publishing best practices can provide states that are 
interested in fulfilling their obligations with useful 
information on effectiveness and implementation. This is 
a “highly soft” mechanism229 that does not have coercive 
power and depends entirely on the willingness of states to 
make use of the available information. However, the 
emulation of best practices could be more durable than 
policy shifts caused by coercion and could persist even 
when pressure fades.230 Publishing best practices could 
also lay the foundation for stronger mechanisms, by 
“establish[ing] standards of conduct around which 
coercive measures can be organized.”231 
 
 226.  See id. at 168 (arguing that “[a]n inclusive approach generally produces a body with less 
power”). 
 227.  Renshaw, supra note 144, at 18. 
 228.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 130. 
 229.  Id. at 691. 
 230.  Id. at 696. 
 231.  Id. at 691. 
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Review of 
state-initiated 
reports   
This mechanism primarily serves a “limited, noncoercive 
monitoring” function,232 where a state submits reports of 
its human rights record, actions taken to improve the 
human rights conditions within its borders, or compliance 
with a treaty.233 This mechanism works by creating 
negative publicity (shaming) for states that are 
noncompliant.234   
Fact-finding 
visits and/or 
investigative 
reports 
Unlike review of state-initiated reports, this mechanism 
does not give the state as much control over what 
information is collected on the state’s human rights 
record. However, it usually requires state consent for the 
relevant institution to access that information.235 The 
states need not always adopt the recommendations from 
the investigations, and thus the mechanism depends on 
the willingness of states to cooperate.236  
Friendly 
settlement 
procedure/ 
mediation 
Some major human rights treaties and the Inter-American 
Commission provide for mediation, or “good offices” as 
an option for settling disputes and complaints.237 This 
mechanism works through persuasion, where the 
institution’s high-level officials or commissioners seek to 
influence state governments by facilitating dialogue 
about controversial practices.238  
 
 232.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 82. 
 233.  See Basic Facts about the UPR, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 20, 
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx. 
 234.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 78. 
 235.  See Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (July 12, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTB 
Petitions.aspx (“Inquiries may only be undertaken with respect to States parties who have recognized 
the competence of the relevant Committee in this regard.”). U.N. Special Procedures have to obtain an 
invitation from the particular government before conducting a country visit for fact-finding purposes. 
Country and Visits of Special Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/CountryandothervisitsSP.aspx. 
 236.   DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 79. 
 237.  Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 28(1)(b) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights call for the friendly settlement of complaints, and Article 
41(1)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows parties to use its good 
offices. Patricia Ravenhorst, International Human Rights Law Versus National Sovereignty: Can The 
Friendly Settlement Mechanism Relieve The Tension? 18 (2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Duke 
University) (on file with Library Service Center, Duke University). 
 238.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 127. 
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For the Inter-American System, states are incentivized to 
use this option and reach an agreement.239 Failure to 
settle in mediation would allow the Commission to take 
stronger actions, such as publishing detailed public 
reports and non-binding recommendations, or referring 
the dispute to the Inter-American Court, if the state has 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.240 The potential for 
private settlements makes mediation more palatable than 
the following mechanisms, which involve public shaming 
or formal adjudication.241  
Inter-state 
complaints, 
individual 
communi-
cations, and 
inquiries   
These three mechanisms for complaints are standard for 
most U.N. treaty bodies.242 The inter-state complaint 
mechanism allows state parties to complain to a treaty 
body about alleged violations by another state party.243  
The individual communications mechanism allows 
“anyone”—individuals, and sometimes NGOs or other 
representatives—to file a complaint against a state party 
that has accepted this procedure, for rights violations 
covered by the relevant treaty.244 After a treaty body 
receives the complaint, it corresponds with the state, 
inquires with independent sources, and issues 
recommendations.245 However, the recommendations are 
not binding in international law, and states do not have to 
respond to the body.246 The inquiry mechanism allows a 
treaty body to initiate confidential inquiries on its own 
accord “if [it] ha[s] received reliable information 
containing well-founded indications of serious or 
systematic violations” of the relevant treaty.247 This 
mechanism depends on the “cooperation of the [s]tate 
party . . . at all stages” of the inquiry.248 
 
 239.  Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 22–23. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  See id. at 22–24. 
 242.  Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx (last visited July 
12, 2014). 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 85. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 242. 
 248.  Id. 
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Binding 
adjudication   
The strongest enforcement mechanism that Regional 
Systems have employed involves a court that can make 
findings of violations and legally binding decisions for 
states subject to its jurisdiction.249 Strong political will is 
a prerequisite for this mechanism, because it not only 
allows the human rights institution to publicly criticize 
the state, but also forces the state to adopt remedial 
procedures that may be costly. In addition, a binding 
instrument such as a convention or treaty that outlines the 
legal obligations of the state parties must precede the 
court before it can hold state parties legally accountable. 
The court’s jurisdiction is based on state consent, and 
individuals may or may not have standing to sue states 
directly through the regional courts.250 The three main 
Regional Systems all have regional courts.  
 
The mechanisms above persuade, encourage, or coerce states to 
comply with norms. They may have spillover effects on norm building but 
do not directly focus on the latter.251 These mechanisms are by no means 
exhaustive and do not include the strategies that informal and diplomatic 
channels can employ.252 The abovementioned mechanisms can be 
introduced in three stages, as categorized below—short-term, mid-term, 
and long-term. 
a. Short-term evolution 
Promotional activities are a natural starting point because they are less 
threatening to the status quo.253 Since the ASEAN Commission’s mandate 
is mainly promotional, the Commission could use its existing powers to 
build and standardize norms. The Commission should encourage states to 
accept norms that are stronger than non-binding guidelines, by encouraging 
ratification of existing U.N. treaties relating to human rights, or further 
 
 249.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 123. 
 250.  See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
 251.  While activities that build on or standardize substantive legal norms are essential, the process 
of norm building is complex and entails a different set of considerations that calls for an independent 
study. Part III of this Note will offer some general suggestions as to when and where the norm-building 
process should happen in relation to the rest of the human rights mechanisms, for example, suggesting 
that the ASEAN Commission provide general comments to the ASEAN Declaration. 
 252.  For example, tying Preferential Trade Agreements with human rights implementation. See 
Hafner-Burton, supra note 80, at 278; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, supra note 93. 
 253.  Thio, supra note 19, at 76. 
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refining the ASEAN Declaration into more concrete practices and 
guidelines.254 The ASEAN Commission should also engage civil society to 
help form consensus around norms on national levels.255 As some 
negotiators have suggested, the ASEAN Commission can also expand on 
its existing work by creatively interpreting its mandate to perform functions 
that are not forbidden, such as investigating, reporting, and arbitrating.256 
The ASEAN Commission could also start with “soft” mechanisms that 
have lower costs for state sovereignty, such as developing and publishing 
best practices. States with better human rights records or stronger political 
will could find these best practices useful, and if they start adopting them, 
other ASEAN states may be socialized to follow suit.257 The ASEAN 
Commission has started to encourage the sharing of best practices through 
workshops that involve other Regional Systems and civil society.258 
However, the contents of these discussions are not publicized on the 
Commission’s website. This limits the public’s ability to monitor progress. 
Such best practices should be made public so that civil society can use 
them as a tool to accelerate state adoption of these practices. 
The ASEAN Commission can then introduce the reporting mechanism 
to facilitate the “open exchange of ideas and experiences.”259 A state’s very 
process of identifying and reflecting on its human rights practices 
encourages compliance.260 All ASEAN states, as members of the United 
Nations, are already required to submit a report of their human rights 
conditions to the United Nations every four years.261 States that have 
ratified human rights treaties have an additional obligation to submit 
reports to the relevant treaty-based bodies.262 However, the ASEAN 
Commission’s mandate does not expressly authorize it to require states to 
 
 254.  This would help solidify norms and bridge the gap between norms and implementation. 
 255.  This is because domestic human rights development strengthens the Regional System. 
Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177. 
 256.  Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
 257.  This is mostly likely to occur as the social pressure of other states’ actions drive acculturation, 
where “actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” GOODMAN & JINKS, 
supra note 4, at 22. 
 258.  Press Release, ASEAN Intergovernmental Comm’n on Human Rights, The AICHR Workshop 
on Regional Mechanisms: Best Practices on Implementation of Human Rights (with Partial Support 
from UN Women and Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) (Nov. 21, 2014), http://aichr.org/ 
report/press-release-the-aichr-workshop-on-regional-mechanisms-best-practices-on-implementation-of-
human-rights-with-partial-support-from-un-women-and-regional-eu-asean-dialogue-instrument/. 
 259.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 127. 
 260.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 82–83. 
 261.  This refers to the U.N. Periodic Review process. Id. at 78. 
 262.  Id. at 81. 
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report on their human rights records or review the states’ reports.263  Thus, 
the ASEAN Commission would need to creatively interpret its mandate to 
add this mechanism to its toolbox. 
To make the state-driven reporting mechanism more palatable, the 
ASEAN Commission could emphasize that, if given this power, it would 
serve to complement rather than duplicate the existing reporting obligations 
to the United Nations and treaty bodies. Some have argued that the 
reporting mechanism is likely ineffective against states with poor human 
rights records, since their civil society, which amplifies publicity of the 
reports, is less robust.264 Also, reporting does not impose sanctions apart 
from negative publicity, which may be insufficient to overcome the 
political benefits of violating human rights.265 However, the limited power 
of this mechanism may work in favor of its adoption. Because states 
prepare the reports, they have the power to pick and choose what goes into 
them. This is a chance for the states to skew the narrative in favor of their 
human rights records,266 at least before the ASEAN Commission reviews 
them. For states that want to reframe the narrative or are proud of some 
portion of their records, this opportunity may be too good to decline. 
b. Mid-term evolution 
After achieving a minimum degree of success at unifying human 
rights norms within ASEAN, the ASEAN Commission could move on to 
this stage when its role expands from promotion to protection. Since the 
ASEAN Commission could submit, in addition to an annual report of its 
activities, “other reports if deemed necessary,” it could creatively interpret 
this language to include the power to submit investigatory reports of 
country conditions.267 Alternatively, ASEAN could expressly empower the 
ASEAN Commission to conduct investigations and determine violations to 
generate a report, with recommendations for state action. The three main 
regional commissions have all employed this mechanism,268 which shows 
that it could be feasible for the ASEAN system as well. Even though the 
states do not control the narrative of their human rights records at this 
 
 263.  See Croydon, supra note 69, at 29. 
 264.  See DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 83 (noting that reporting “is most likely to have an impact 
where it is not critically needed: that is, where human rights records are relatively good.”). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  States can do this through omission of bad facts, emphasizing areas of progress, and/or lying. 
 267.  ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.13. 
 268.  Although the European Commission of Human Rights has ceased to exist (since it merged 
into the European Court of Human Rights in 1998), it did employ the mechanism discussed here while 
it was in operation. 
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stage, they need not adopt the recommendations from the investigations.269 
However, as long as the reports are made publicly available, the negative 
publicity generated from the findings could be sufficient to force states to 
respond to the situation. 
For example, the Inter-American Commission demonstrated the power 
of the court of public opinion when it published reports of murderous 
political projects in Latin America in the 1970s.270  The Inter-American 
Commission construed its vaguely-worded mandate to empower itself with 
the ability to prepare reports on the human rights conditions in members 
states.271 Using the reporting tool, the Inter-American Commission turned 
itself into an accusatory “[h]emispheric [g]rand [j]ury, storming around 
Latin America to vacuum up evidence of high crimes,”272 shocking the 
repressive governments that created it.273 The reports drove some officials 
who were responsible for the violations to cease and flee the country.274 
The major challenge would be changing the audience of the reports from 
being restricted to ASEAN Foreign Ministers275 to the general public. 
Again, ASEAN would have to muster sufficient political will to allow the 
public to examine its human rights record. 
The ASEAN Commission should also fully utilize thematic or special 
working groups and subcommittees, such as the ASEAN Committee on 
Migrant Workers.276 Subcommittees cover a narrower range of issues and 
could thus employ stronger mechanisms early on, such as making reports 
and conducting fact-finding visits. These committees and working groups 
could include experts, CSOs, and academics, thereby delegating the 
difficult tasks away from the political ASEAN Commission towards more 
neutral, independent groups that could act more quickly. These working 
groups could emulate the best practices of the U.N. Human Rights 
Council’s special working groups and rapporteurs, who are individuals or 
small groups of independent experts that use this mechanism to investigate 
 
 269.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 79. 
 270.  Farer, supra note 148, at 511–12. 
 271.  Id. at 511. 
 272.  Id. at 512. 
 273.  Id. at 511. 
 274.  Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 172 n.96 (citing Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on 
the Sitution of Human Rights in Argentina, pts. A(3), B, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49 doc. 19 (Apr. 11, 1980)). 
 275.  Currently, the ASEAN Commission can only submit reports to the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers. ASEAN Commission T.O.R., supra note 22, art. 4.13. 
 276.  In 2007, ASEAN established this committee, which meets annually. ASEAN Committee on 
Migrant Workers, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASEAN ONLINE PLATFORM (Feb. 22, 2014), http://humanrights 
inasean.info/asean-committee-migrant-workers/about.html. 
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human rights issues related to specific themes or countries.277 
The inter-state complaint mechanism should likely not be used, given 
its zero utilization rate in treaty-monitoring bodies.278 It is also 
unimaginable that ASEAN’s strong adherence to non-interference and 
peaceful resolution279 would permit states to accuse each other of 
violations. However, this stage could allow individuals to file human rights 
complaints with the ASEAN Commission. 
The strength of the complaint mechanism could be limited by giving 
states the option to resolve the case privately through mediation. Instead of 
having the ASEAN Commission investigate complaints and make its 
recommendations public, using the ASEAN Commission as a mediator 
allows the state to reach a private resolution with the complainant. States 
would be motivated to respond to complaints and settle in mediation 
because failing to do so would result in the ASEAN Commission 
publicizing its findings and recommendations. If states refuse to settle in 
mediation or respond to the complaint, states will suffer the reputational 
costs of being declared a violator, but no sanction beyond that. It is difficult 
to threaten states with anything else, because ASEAN has been reluctant to 
sanction members, even for gross violations, such as those that occurred in 
Myanmar.280 
Although the international community has largely ignored this 
procedure,281 it could be highly relevant and feasible for the ASEAN 
system, which prefers peaceful and friendly resolutions with minimal 
intrusiveness. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission has employed 
this mechanism successfully in a dispute involving Argentina, resulting in 
compensation for the victims.282 Since states have a say in how the alleged 
 
 277.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 78–79. There are thirty-nine thematic and fourteen country 
mandates as of October 2014, spanning civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. Special 
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. 
 278.  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 242. 
 279.  See supra Part I.C.1. 
 280.  ASEAN accepted Myanmar’s application for membership despite the Myanmar coup and 
human rights violations associated with it.  Thio, supra note 19, at 40.  For a detailed account of 
Myanmar’s acceptance into ASEAN despite its human rights record, including detention of opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, see Arendshorst, supra note 109. 
 281.  Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 5. 
 282.  See Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report on the Friendly Settlement Procedure in Cases 10.288, 
10.310, 10.436, 10.496, 10.631, and 10.711,  No. 1/93, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1993). In these 
cases, the petitioners argued that the Argentine government failed to provide effective judicial remedies 
to victims of arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Argentine government agreed to the friendly 
settlement procedure. Id. The negotiations concluded with a commitment by the Argentine government 
to provide for the payment of compensation to the petitioners, and after the Inter-American Commission 
14_WANG_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  9:48 PM 
420 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:385 
violation is resolved, mediation is less intrusive upon state sovereignty and 
less adversarial when compared to court.283 Mediation could also provide a 
direct remedy for victims.284 However, the ASEAN Commission should 
closely monitor the mediation process to offset any coercive power 
differential between the government and the complainants. Mediation also 
has its drawbacks. Since mediation is confidential and settlements have no 
precedential value, it has the potential to shield states from national and 
international scrutiny, and does not contribute to the development of human 
rights law jurisprudence.285 Furthermore, compensation for victims places a 
monetary price on violations, allowing the states to purchase violations, 
treating compensation as the cost of doing business the way they prefer.286 
c. Long-term evolution 
This is the mature stage, which employs the strongest enforcement 
mechanism—a court. The regional court will issue binding decisions on 
states, possibly interpreting a binding regional instrument such as a 
convention. The ASEAN Commission could push for ratification of a 
regional convention, with an opt-in provision for submitting to a regional 
court’s jurisdiction. Although the court’s strength and jurisdiction could be 
restricted at the beginning, this stage nevertheless requires sufficient 
political will from states to allow a court to make substantial intrusions into 
state sovereignty. 
Determining when to progress in the evolutionary sequence is a 
difficult task. It is impossible to propose a one-size-fits-all approach to this 
question, but lessons from other Regional Systems indicate that political 
will and ideological consensus are the requisite conditions that determine 
progress from one stage to another.287 These other Regional Systems 
counsel patience in waiting for conditions to ripen. 
Yet, sometimes a progressive change is needed to prevent stagnation. 
Generally, softer mechanisms usually do not require much in terms of 
political will.288 However, to move from promotion to protection 
necessitates “significant sacrifices” from the states, and typically requires 
“external material power or internal substantive commitment” to overcome 
 
monitored the government’s progress and actual payment, the Commission closed the case. Id. 
 283.  Ravenhorst, supra note 237, at 16–17. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  See id. 
 286.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 178–79. 
 287.  DONNELLY, supra note 106, at 105–08. 
 288.  Id. at 105. 
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“strong barriers at the threshold.”289 In addition, there has to be some level 
of homogeneity in sociocultural and ideological consensus290 so that the 
norms can be implemented in a consistent manner. At the very least, there 
needs to be a regional human rights “culture.”291 Though these conditions 
can be difficult to satisfy, the ASEAN human rights system is not 
necessarily immobilized. Instead of passively waiting for ideal conditions 
to materialize, the ASEAN Commission could socialize states within 
ASEAN to best practices, and other actors and institutions could hasten or 
create the conditions necessary for the ASEAN Commission’s evolution. 
B. Role of other actors and institutions 
In other Regional Systems, national institutions, civil society, and 
external factors propelled the development of formal regional 
mechanisms.292 These other actors can play an instrumental role in creating 
the conditions necessary for the ASEAN Commission to progress in the 
evolutionary sequence. There are four levels of actors and institutions—
grassroots, national, regional, and international—that can generate the push 
and pull effects from inside and outside ASEAN.293 Grassroots and national 
efforts within ASEAN can generate an internal push towards building a 
regional consensus around norms and mechanisms. The international 
community and the Asia Pacific Forum, a network of NHRIs in the Asia 
Pacific,294  can generate an external pull from outside ASEAN towards 
similar ends. 
1. Grassroots level: CSOs  
CSOs should create a human rights culture that starts at the grassroots 
level and “permeates both the citizenry and [the] officialdom.”295 To 
achieve this, CSOs should continue to lobby for increased access to 
information and participation in official (inter)governmental dialogue and 
in the ASEAN Commission. The Working Group for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism, which currently has participatory rights in ASEAN, 
should leverage this opportunity to increase the voice of CSOs. CSOs also 
have an entry point in the Asia Pacific Forum,296 and could use the Forum’s 
 
 289.  Id. at 108. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Thio, supra note 19, at 78. 
 292.  Aguirre and Pietropaoli, supra note 30, at 177. 
 293.  See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text. 
 294.  See generally Durbach et al., supra note 43. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 233. 
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influence on NHRIs to achieve bottom-up advocacy for human rights.297 
Also, CSOs should fill the information gap in reporting, documenting, and 
researching local human rights conditions, so as to generate a concern for 
human rights from within ASEAN. A strong civil society and a culture of 
human rights could hold state governments accountable when they make 
disingenuous commitments,298 such as using the ASEAN Commission as a 
tool to relieve pressure for real change. ASEAN’s creation of the ASEAN 
Commission and the ASEAN Declaration can result in a “shift in domestic 
political opportunity structure”299 by opening new avenues for domestic 
CSOs. Specifically, these formal commitments to human rights legitimize 
human rights norms and the CSOs that champion them. Furthermore, 
shallow commitments to human rights norms can evolve into deeper 
commitments through the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,”300 where the 
public demand for consistency in official commitments makes hypocritical 
commitment unsustainable.301 CSOs can leverage citizens’ expectation that 
public officials live up to their public rhetoric to turn hypocritical 
endorsement of human rights norms into actual commitments.302 ASEAN 
states’ shallow commitments to human rights represent partial victories for 
human rights movements. These victories, rather than relieving pressure 
from CSOs, can often have a ratcheting-up effect where civil society 
escalates its demands, enabling a norm that is merely acceptable to become 
encouraged, and eventually unequivocally required.303 
2. National level: NHRIs and domestic courts  
Member states should strengthen existing NHRIs and encourage the 
formation of new ones. NHRIs are beneficial because they can be 
monitored through the Paris Principles, which are international standards 
for NHRIs.304 Since they are also closer to the ground, they can experiment 
with creative ways to implement international human rights norms while 
respecting local culture.305 As laboratories for experiments, they can test 
out which ideas could work for the region, and then transmit them to the 
 
 297.  See Hadiprayitno, supra note 25, at 15. 
 298.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 299.  See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 145. 
 300.  Id. at 150; Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
97, 111 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). 
 301.  GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 150. 
 302.  See id. at 150–51. 
 303.  Id. at 155–56. 
 304.  Durbach et al., supra note 43, at 237–38. 
 305.  Id. 
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ASEAN Commission and the Asia Pacific Forum.306 
Coordination among NHRIs is essential to prevent fragmented 
interpretation and enforcement of regionally-recognized rights. The 
ASEAN NHRI Forum, consisting of the four accredited NHRIs in the 
ASEAN region, should include Myanmar’s NHRI in its activities and help 
Myanmar’s NHRI achieve accreditation status.307 The ASEAN 
Commission could also support national courts that enforce human rights. 
For example, Indonesia has a human rights court that tries “gross violations 
of human rights that consist of genocide and crimes against humanity.”308 
However, in 2006, a U.N. Commission of Experts found that Indonesia’s 
human rights court’s prosecution lacked commitment and expertise in the 
subject matter.309 The ASEAN Commission could provide these national 
courts with resources such as training to boost their currently weak capacity 
for hearing human rights cases.310 However, a key caveat for developing 
NHRIs and domestic courts is that they are highly dependent on states’ 
willingness to grant them the level of independence and autonomy that they 
require. 
3. Regional level: coordination with the Asia Pacific Forum and the 
ACWC   
The ACWC’s mandate and functions should be clarified to avoid any 
overlap with that of the ASEAN Commission, since such overlap could 
mean that neither organization can be held directly accountable for a lack 
of progress. This would require coordination between ACWC, the ASEAN 
Commission, and relevant ASEAN decision makers. A second regional 
actor is the Asia Pacific Forum. ASEAN regularly invites the ASEAN 
NHRI Forum to participate in consultations.311 The Asia Pacific Forum, 
through the ASEAN NHRI Forum, can influence ASEAN and has begun to 
function as a watchdog for ASEAN.312 Suggested functions for the Asia 
 
 306.  Croydon, supra note 69, at 32. 
 307.  Currently, Myanmar’s National Institution does not conform to the Paris Principles, and thus 
does not have full membership in the Asia Pacific Forum. See ASIA PACIFIC FORUM, supra note 51. 
Helping Mynamar’s National Institution achieve accreditation would strengthen Mynamar’s human 
rights activism since accreditation requires independence from the state and a minimum standard of 
competence. See INT’L COORDINATING COMM., supra note 49. 
 308.  Mahdev Mohan, HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, RULE OF LAW FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE ASEAN REGION: A BASE-LINE STUDY94, available at http://hrrca.org/system/files/Rule_of_Law_ 
for_Human_Rights_in_the_ASEAN_Region.pdf. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Croydon, supra note 69, at 31. 
 312.  Id.  Some of the areas in which the Asia Pacific Forum has influenced human rights in 
ASEAN include: “encouragement of NHRIs compliant with the Paris Principles in ASEAN member 
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Pacific Forum include “becom[ing] the voice that seeks to enhance . . .  
ASEAN human rights institutions, . . . infiltrating the ranks of ASEAN and 
seeking to improve from within, generat[ing] greater pressure on the former 
externally . . . by regularly sending reports to the U.N. on the state of 
ASEAN’s initiative.”313 
4. International level: actors outside ASEAN   
International pressure creates political will among ASEAN leaders to 
address human rights issues.314 The U.N. bodies, the international 
community, and other Regional Systems could continue to assert lateral 
pressure from outside ASEAN through socialization techniques such as 
acculturation and persuasion. As international enforcement of human rights 
strengthens, ASEAN would likely feel pressured to keep up with the rest of 
the world—even if ASEAN lags behind the rest of the world on a relative 
level, ASEAN’s commitment to human rights could improve in absolute 
terms.315 Also, as non-ASEAN states learn that ASEAN’s nominal 
commitment do not signal genuine acceptance of human rights norms, 
these states could require ASEAN to enact increasingly meaningful reforms 
to capture the same social benefits.316 
The international community can also increase the effectiveness of 
social pressure by increasing the strength, immediacy, and size of the 
reference group that ASEAN aspires to emulate.317 ASEAN currently looks 
to the other Regional Systems as the reference group, specifically invoking 
the European Union (EU) as the group to aspire to.318  The EU has and 
should continue to reach out to ASEAN to share its experience and best 
practices in human rights systems, as an extension of EU-ASEAN political 
and economic ties.319 Other Regional Systems are also engaging with the 
ASEAN Commission, starting with simple dialogue and workshops.320 
 
states where these still do not exist; monitoring ASEAN’s delivery on promises such as, for example, 
the one it made through the Cebu Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers; and correction of AICHR’s shortcomings with regards to power, mandate and output.” Id. 
 313.  See id. 
 314.  See Aung, supra note 167 (describing a Myanmar human rights activist’s view that “without 
international pressure, ASEAN leaders have no will to address human rights issues”). 
 315.  See GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 4, at 141–42. 
 316.  See id. at 156. 
 317.  See id. at 28. 
 318.  Munro, supra note 81, at 23. 
 319.  FOSTERING HUMAN RIGHTS AMONG EUROPEAN POLICIES [FRAME], REPORT ON THE MAPPING 
STUDY ON RELEVANT ACTORS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 42 (2014), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/ 
wp-content/materiale/reports/02-Deliverable-4.1.pdf. 
 320.  Experts from Inter-American, European, and African Regional Systems participated in a 
workshop to share and exchange best practices. See The AICHR Workshop on Regional Mechanisms, 
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Although non-ASEAN governments cannot fund the ASEAN 
Commission’s protection of human rights, they can channel funds to local 
CSOs and other avenues that need resources. International civil society 
should also strengthen its relationship with ASEAN states. For example, 
encouraging membership in international nongovernmental organizations 
would publicize local violations and hold state governments accountable.321 
CONCLUSION 
This Note examines a puzzle—how a region allergic to human rights 
could design an effective human rights system. It proposes an ASEAN 
regional human rights framework in light of ASEAN’s regional 
particularities and challenges, its institutional limitations and fractured 
norms, and lessons from other Regional Systems. The result is a strategic 
choice and sequence of human rights mechanisms and procedural reforms 
for the ASEAN Commission, complemented by multilayered institutions 
and actors that exert external, internal, and bottom-up influence. 
Although much care has been taken in designing this proposed 
framework, it is nevertheless limited by open questions in the institutional 
design literature. The institutional design of law, such as the degree of 
delegation and flexibility, involves tradeoffs not yet well understood.322 
Debates about the causal mechanisms through which regimes influence 
human rights, such as coercion and persuasion, are inconclusive.323 Also, 
there is a lot of variation in how states participate in legal regimes in terms 
of which regimes they choose and how deeply they commit.324 This 
variation, especially in the sovereignty costs of participation, may affect the 
suitability of legal flexibility mechanisms and is not yet fully explored.325 
The proposed framework would benefit from future research in these 
relevant areas. 
A Regional System has to garner enough state support to exist and 
function, but it cannot prostrate itself before the states and ignore state 
violations. The difficulty lies in striking the balance. The proposed 
framework seeks to help ASEAN’s system find the elusive equilibrium—
the delicate balance between global norms and local conditions—gradually 
and sequentially. The framework reconciles international standards and 
local particularities through selective sequencing and combination of multi-
 
supra note 258. 
 321.  See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 322.  Hafner-Burton, supra note 80, at 279. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. at 271. 
 325.  Id. 
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layered actors. This approach may be relevant to developing human rights 
systems for regions that still lack them, such as the Arab Middle East and 
Asia as a whole. 
 
